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WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
the importance of detailed analysis of the probative value of the
evidence and the necessity of balancing probative value against the pre-
judicial impact." 2 Only through detailed analysis and evaluation can the
Fourth Circuit define and maintain clear standards to apply when con-
sidering similar acts evidence."3
BARRY J. GAINEY
IX. INSURANCE
Joinder of Partially Subrogated Insurers
To promote justice, speed, and economy in litigation, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) provide measures for assembl-
ing in one action all persons and issues that are necessary for the com-
plete resolution of a dispute.' A court usually will not allow an additional
person or issue in a lawsuit if the extra person or issue could prejudicially
affect the resolution of the suit.2 For example, the disclosure of a party's
insurance coverage may be prejudicial because a jury may consider an
insurance company better than an individual at absorbing the cost of in-
102 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); supra notes 83 & 84 and accompanying text (some courts
admit similar acts evidence without analysis).
3 See supra note 83 and accompanying text (some courts admit similar acts evidence
without analysis).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (goal of civil procedure is speedy, fair, and inexpensive litiga-
tion); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.1 at 451-52 (2d ed. 1977) (Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provide for liberal joinder of parties and claims in one lawsuit). The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) contain various ways that a court or a party
can include additional issues or parties in an action. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a)-(fD (counter-
claim provides means of adjudicating all claims between opposing parties); FED. R. Civ. P.
13(g) (cross-claim permits adjudication of claims between coparties that arise out of same
transaction as original claim); FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (court may consolidate actions involving
common question of law or fact); FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (court can compel joinder of person when
risk of multiple litigation or prejudice exists); FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (persons with interest in ac-
tion may intervene).
2 See Dupont v. Southern Pacific Co., 366 F.2d 193, 196-97 (5th Cir. 1966) (consolidation
of two related accident claims prejudicial if consolidation creates confusion for jurors), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 958 (1967); Atkinson v. Roth, 297 F.2d 570, 575-76 (3d Cir. 1961) (consolida-
tion of accident cases rendered issues and jury instructions too confusing and prejudicial
because automobile driver was plaintiff in one action and defendant in four other actions);-
Baker v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 11 F.R.D. 440, 440-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (consolidation of per-
sonal injury cases arising out of explosion was improper because disparity in degree of
plaintiffs' injuries created risk of jury prejudice to defendant); see also infra text accompa-




juries or damages.' A majority of state jurisdictions, therefore, do not
allow evidence of an insurer's interest in a lawsuit,' and relatively few
states allow a direct action against a tortfeasor's insurance company.'
The reason behind the majority view is to prevent a jury from finding
liability only because a defendant's insurer can afford to pay a damage
award.' A similar rationale exists when a plaintiff has insurance, because
a jury might refuse to find liability only because the plaintiff's insurer
can bear the cost of damages better than an individual defendant.7 The
possibility of compulsory joinder under Federal Rules 17 and 19,
therefore, can be a strategic disadvantage to a plaintiff in a diversity
case involving a partially subrogated insurer.'
Generally, the term subrogation means that one person may take a
second person's place with respect to legal rights and remedies against a
third person2 Subrogation of an insurer occurs when the insurer com-
See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 282a at 148 (Chadbourn
rev. 1979) (risk of jury prejudice derives from financial disparity between insurance com-
pany and individual party); see also Edwards, Inc. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 466'F.
Supp. 505, 513 (D.S.C. 1978) (substantial risk of jury prejudice exists if jury is aware of in-
surance coverage); White Hall Bldg. Co. v. Profexray Div. of"Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp.
1202, 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (indisputable risk of jury prejudice exists upon disclosure of in-
surance coverage), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1978); ef: F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra
note 1, § 9.4 at 399-400 (concealing insurance from jury provides strategic advantage to in-
sured party); Kennedy, Federal Rule 17(a): Will the Real Party in Interest Please Stand?,
51 MINN. L. REv. 675, 686 (1967) (insurers avoid joinder to prevent prejudice).
"See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5361 at 426-27
(1980) (mqst staies have provision that prohibits evidence' of insurance coverage on issue of
defendant's liability); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-23.01 to -2302 (1956); CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1155 (1966 & Supp. 1981); MINN. R. EVID. 411; N.J. R. EVID. 411; N.M. R. EVID. 411;
OHIO R. EVID. 411; WASH. R. EVID. 411; WIs. R. EVID. 904.11.
I Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §'22.655 (West 1978) (injured person may bring direct
action against tortfeasor's insurer When accident or injury occurs in Louisiana) and Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 632.24 (West 1980 & Supp. 1982) (injured person may bring direct action
against insurer) with VA. CODE § 38.1-380 (Repl. 1981) (injured person can bring direct action
against defendant's insurer only after unexecuted judgment against defendant).
' See Phillips, Mention of Insurance During Trial* 1961 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 247, 247
(practical reason behind general rule prohibiting evidence of insurance is to prevent ex-
cessive verdicts and verdicts of liability that may result from jury's knowledge that defend-
ant won't have to pay the awird); see also FED. R. EVID. 411 advisory committee note
(disclosure of defendant's insurance gives jury an improper basis for finding liability).
I See .Kint v. Terrain King Corp., 79 F.R.D. 10, 12 n.4 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (disclosure of a
plaintiff' insurance may prejudice jury against the insured plaintiff); Kennedy, supra note
3, at 686 (jury's awareness of a plaintiffs insurance coverage may be prejudicial to the plain-
tiff); Kessner, Federal Court Interpretations of the Real Party in Interest Rule in Cases of
Subrogation, 39 NEB. L. -REV. 452, 461-62 (1960) (joinder of a plaintiffs insurer may result in
jury prejudice).
Compare Wadsworth v. United States Postal Serv., 511 F.2d 64, 65 (7th Cir. 1975)
(defendant can compel joinder of plaintiffs partially subrogated insurer) with Miller v.
Tomlinson, 194 Va. 367, 372-73, 73 S.E.2d 378, 380-82 (1952) (Virginia law protects plaintiffs
from jury prejudice by prohibiting-compulsory joinder of subrogated insurers).
' See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LANW OF REMEDIES 250-52 (1973) (subrogation occurs
19831
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pensates an insured person for a loss caused by a third person.10 An in-
surer becomes a subrogee when the insurer fully compensates an in-
suree, and the insuree becomes a subrogor. 1' An insurer is a partial
subrogee if the insurer only partially compensates an insuree."
Federal Rule 17 requires that the real party in interest prosecute an
action. 3 A real party in interest is a person that may enforce a substan-
when one person may substitute for another person to enforce right against third person).
Subrogation originated as an equitable remedy that prevented unfair results, such as the
unjust enrichment of an obligor. Id. at 250-51. Subrogation protected any person that for a
legitimate reason had discharged an obligor's obligation with the discharger's personal
property. Id. at 251-52; see RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 162 (1937 & Supp. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. At common law, equity courts used subrogation to per-
mit a subrogee that had discharged an obligation to sue in the name of a subrogor against
the person that was primarily responsible for the obligation. See RESTATEMENT, supra, at
455. Equity courts constructed an equitable obligation that mirrored the discharged obliga-
tion to give the subrogee a cause of action. See id. at 653-54. Prior to the merger of law and
equity, however, a subrogee could not enforce a right in his own name in an action at law.
See United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 381 (1949) (subrogee's action
at common law had to be in subrogor's name); Clark & Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest,
34 YALE L.J. 259, 270-72 (1925) (subrogee could not sue in own name at law). But see F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 399-402 (subrogee and partial subrogee now can sue in
own names).
1 See 16 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW, §§ 61:2-61:4 at 238-40 (2d ed. 1966)
(insurer becomes subrogated upon payment of compensation). See generally R. HORN,
SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE chs. 2-4 (1964) (history, theory, and legal
significance of subrogation of insurers). When an insurer compensates a person that sustained
a loss, the insurer may be discharging the obligation of a person that caused the loss. Id. at
24-26. The insurer, therefore, assumes the compensated person's rights against the person
responsible for the loss. Id.
" See R. HORN, supra note 10, at 14 (insurer becomes subrogee by compensating in-
jured person and compensated person becomes subrogor).
" See Note, Splitting a Cause of Action and Partial Subrogation in the Insurance
Situation, 39 IOWA L. REV. 355, 356 (1954) (partial subrogee is person that has paid only part
of another person's obligation); see also F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 401-402
(partial subrogation involves less than total compensation for a loss). Partial compensation
for an insured's loss includes situations where an insured's policy has a deductible amount.
See Wadsworth v. United States Postal Serv., 511 F.2d 64, 65-67 (7th Cir. 1975) (deductible
clause in policy makes an insured a partial subrogor with sufficient interest to be a real party
in interest). Although equity courts allowed a total subrogee to sue in his own name, a par-
tial subrogee could not recover except through a suit by the partial subrogor for the use of
the partial subrogee. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, at 655-56. Currently, however, a par-
tial subrogee may be a real party in interest that can sue to recover any compensation paid
to an insured person. See United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 380-81
(1949) (both partial subrogee and partial subrogor are entitled to sue as real parties in in-
terest against tortfeasor); infra text accompanying note 16 (majority of state jurisdictions
consider partial subrogee real party in interest).
13 FED. R. CIv. P. 17(a). Federal Rule 17 provides that the real party in interest must be
the named party that prosecutes an action. Id. A real party in interest must possess a
substantive right to enforce a claim. See Rosenfeld v. Continental Bldg. & Operating Co., 135
F. Supp. 465, 467 (W.D. Mo. 1955) (definition of real party in interest is person with right to
enforce claim); 3A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.07 at 17-65 (2d ed.
1982) [hereinafter cited as MOORE] (real party in interest refers to person with substantive
[Vol. 40:459
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tive right. 4 In diversity cases, courts look to state law to determine the
person entitled to enforce a right." A majority of state jurisdictions con-
right to bring suit). Federal Rule 17 recognizes that the real party in interest is not
necessarily the person that will ultimately benefit from the suit. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
Federal Rule 17 lists several examples of real parties in interest that have statutory or com-
mon law authorization to sue on behalf of someone else. See id. (trustees, bailees, executors,
third party beneficiaries, and guardians are examples of real parties in interest that can sue
on behalf of someone else).
Federal Rule 17 provides three remedial measures to validate a lawsuit when a person
other than a real party in interest brings an action. See id. First, a court can substitute the
real party in interest for the original plaintiff. Id. Second, the real party in interest can join
as a coplaintiff in the action. Id. Third, the real party in interest can ratify the action such
that the real party in interest will be bound by the judgment. See id.; see also Urrutia Avia-
tion Enterprises v. B.B. Burson & Assoc., 406 F.2d 769, 770 (5th Cir. 1969) (written instru-
ment that bound both assignor and assignee complied with Federal Rule 17). Dismissal of an
action for a real party in interest defect is not appropriate until the plaintiff has had both
notice and an opportunity to correct the defect. See FED. R. CIv. P. 17(a) (plaintiff has
reasonable time after notice of real-party-in-interest objection to seek ratification, joinder,
or substitution of real party in interest).
Courts disagree whether a plaintiff may proceed alone when the plaintiff is one of
several real parties in interest. Compare Prevor-Mayorsohn Caribbean, Inc. v. Puerto Rico
Marine Management, Inc., 620 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1980) (as long as one'real party in interest
sues, additional real parties in interest need not join in lawsuit if the judgment will bind all
real parties in interest) and Allen v. Baker, 327 F. Supp. 706, 709-10 (N.D. Miss. 1968) (one
real party in interest could sue without compulsory joinder of other real parties when state
wrongful death statute allowed suit by any of several persons) with Levitt & Sons, Inc. v.
Swirnow, 58 F.R.D. 524, 529-31 (D. Md. 1973) (all property owners interested in injunctive
proceeding must join as plaintiffs). A majority of courts require joinder of additional real
parties only when a defendant moves for joinder, because the purpose of joinder is to pro-
tect a defendant from multiple actions. See United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338
U.S. 366, 381 (1949) (defendant could compel joinder of additional real party in interest by
timely motion); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 84 (4th
Cir. 1973) (joinder of all real parties in interest is usually appropriate upon motion by defend-
ant), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); see also 3A MOORE, supra, 17.09 at 17-92 to -93
(defendant can waive joinder requirement concerning all real parties in interest because
joinder is only a protective measure for defendants). Some courts, therefore, deny a defend-
ant's motion for joinder when one action will completely adjudicate a claim and bar related
suits by other real parties in interest. See Glacier Gen. Assurance Co. v. G. Gordon Symons
Co., 631 F.2d 131, 134-35 (9th Cir. 1980) (joinder of reinsurers that were real parties in in-
terest was not necessary because state law allowed insurer to prosecute entire claim and
federal law precluded subsequent action by reinsurers); Estate of Johnson v. Bellville Hosp.,
56 F.R.D. 380, 384 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (no need to join all persons that are additional real par-
ties in interest if state law authorizes plaintiff to sue on behalf of other real parties in in-
terest and no risk of multiple actions exists); see also infra text accompanying note 21
(discussion of joinder under Federal Rule 19).
" See White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202,
1204 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (test for real party in interest is whether party has a legal right to en-
force a claim), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1978); see also 3A MOORE, supra note 13,
17.07 at 17-65 to 17-75 (real party in interest possesses substantive right to sue on claim); 6
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1543 at 639-47 (1971) (person
with legal right to bring suit is real party in interest) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT &
MILLER].
'" See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69-78 (1938) (state law controls on substan-
1983]
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sider both a partial subrogee and a partial subrogor to be real parties in
interest and allow either to prosecute an action.18 A partial subrogor is a
real party in interest because the partial subrogor should be able to sup-
plement his partial compensation with an award against the tortfeasor
that caused the loss." A partial subrogee is a real party in interest
because the partial subrogee should assume the partial subrogor's right
to recover the balance of the loss from the tortfeasor.'8
Jurisdictions vary on whether a court must join a partial subrogee
as an involuntary plaintiff in a suit by the partial subrogor when the
defendant moves for joinder.'9 Although Federal Rule 19 permits a party
to add another person whose joinder is feasible,"0 the rule requires a
showing that the person's absence will create a substantial risk of in-
justice or inefficiency before the party can accomplish joinder.2 In a par-
tive issues in diversity cases); see also Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 83 (4th Cir. 1973) (state law determines who is real party in interest in
diversity cases), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, suira note 14, § 1544
at 647-51 (citing federal cases where state law supplied identification of real parties in in-
terest); Kennedy, supra note 3, at 678 (determination of real party in interest derives from
state substantive law).
See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 83-84 (4th
Cir. 1973) (both partial subrogee and partial subrogor are real parties in interest under
Virginia law), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); Carlson v. Consumers Power Co., 164 F.
Supp. 692, 693-94 (W.D. Mich. 1957) (both partial subrogee and partial subrogor are real par-
ties in interest under Michigan law); Braniff Airways v. Falkingham, 20 F.R.D. 141, 143 (D.
Minn. 1957) (Minnesota law considers partial subrogees and partial subrogors to have en-
forceable rights); see also 3A MOORE, supra note 13, 17.01 at 17-106 to 17-109 (citing state
and federal cases that hold partial subrogee and partial subrogor real parties in interest).
" See United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 388 U.S. 366, 381 (1949) (insured
still owns part of claim against tortfeasor in partial subrogation situation); see also supra
text accompanying notes 9-12 (explanation of subrogation).
18 See United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 381 (1949) (insurer
possesses right to sue on portion of claim in a partial subrogation situation and is a real party
in interest); see also supra text accompanying notes 9-13 (explanation of subrogation and
real party in interest).
" Compare Garcia v. Hall, 624 F.2d 150, 152, 152 n.5 (10th Cir. 1980) (defendant cannot
compel joinder of partial subrogee in action-by partial subrogor when no risk of multiple
litigation exists) with Wadsworth v. United States. Postal Serv., 511 F.2d 64, 65-67 (7th Cir.
1975) (joinder of partial subrogee required in suit by partial subrogor when defendant
moves for joinder). Disagreement about joinder in partial subrogation situations exists due
to the 1966 amendments to Federal Rule 19 and the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949). See infra text accompanying notes
77-80 (discussion of facts, holding, and impact of A.etna); infra text accompanying note 21
(comparison of. original and amended versions of Federal Rule 19); see also infra text accom-
panying notes 81-83 (additional cases showing disagreement on joinder of partial subrogees).
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Joinder is feasible when a person is amenable to service of
process and the person's presence will not defeat subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Joinder
may not be feasible, however, if a person objects to venue. See 3A MOORE, supra note 13,
19.04 at 19-76; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1610 at
94-108 (1972).
" See FED. R. CIv. P. 19(a). Federal Rule 19(a) addresses the compulsory joinder of all
[Vol. 40:459
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tial subrogation situation, however, the joinder of an insurer may create
a substantial risk of jury prejudice.'
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Riggs,' the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the relationship between Federal
Rules 17 and 19 in a partial subrogation context.24 In Travelers, an
airplane owned by Riggs and piloted by Reid crashed into the home of
persons whose joinder is desirable and feasible. See Edwards, Inc. v. Arlen Realty Dev.
Corp., 466 F. Supp. 505, 512 (D.S.C. 1978) (Federal Rule 19 allows courts to compel joinder of
persons who should be parties); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 364-65 (1967)
(Federal Rule 19 encompasses all situations where joinder is theoretically and practically
desirable); see also supra. text accompanying note 20 (discussion of feasibility). Joinder is
desirable when nonjoinder would create a risk of injustice or inefficiency. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 19(a); 7 WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 33. Nonjoinder may create a risk of inefficiency or pre-
judice to the parties already present, to the person whose joinder is at issue, or to the
judicial system in general. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1) (nonjoinder may render relief between
parties incomplete); id. at (a){2)(i) (nonjoinder may prejudice absent person's interest in ac-
tion); id. at (a)(2)(ii) (nonjoinder may create risk of subsequent or inconsistent judgments
against defendant); see also White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F.
Supp. 1202, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Federal Rule 19 requires joinder to insure complete and
final adjudication of claim), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1978); Ward v. Franklin Equip.
Co., 50 F.R.D. 93, 95 (E.D. Va. 1970) (joinder under Federal Rule 19 insures that all persons
interested in recovery participate ih litigation).
If joinder is desirable, but not feasible, a court must determine whether an absent per-
son is an indispensable party. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b); Garcia v. Hall, 624 F.2d 150, 152
(10th Cir. 1980) (courts should look to guidelines for indispensability in Federal Rule 19(b)
when joinder is desirable but defeats jurisdiction). The term "indispensable" is a conclusory
term for describing a person that has an interest in an action such that a court should
dismiss the action when the person's joinder is not possible. See 3A MOORE, supra note 13,
19.01 at 19-16. Factors that Federal Rule 19 lists to determine whether an action should
proceed without a person whose joinder is desirable include the degree of potential pre-
judice to parties, the potential for corrective measures, the adequacy of a judgment, and the
potential for an adequate remedy in another forum. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b); 3A MOORE,
supra note 13, 19.01 at 19-14 to 19-17 (discussing four factors contained in Federal Rule
19(b) that determine indispensability); see also Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1204, 1204-11 (1966) (discussion of factors relevant to indispensability
under amended version of Federal Rule 19).
The original version of Federal Rule 19(a) provided that joinder was necessary
whenever a person had a joint interest in the subject matter of a lawsuit. See 3A MOORE,
supra note 13, 19.01 at 19-6 to 19-12 (test for necessary joinder under old Federal Rule 19
was whether person had a joint interest with a party to the litigation). The rule was amended
in 1966 to avoid the confusion generated by the terms "joint interest" and "necessary
party." See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee note. The amended version of Federal
Rule 19 contains specific practical guidelines for determining when a person should join an
action and when a court should dismiss the action because the person cannot join. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 19; see also infra note 79 (reason for amendment to rule was confusion about
meaning of term "necessary party").
' See supra text accompanying note 3 (disclosure of a party's insurance coverage may
result in jury prejudice).
671 F.2d 810 (4th Cir. 1982).
24 Id. at 812-14.
1983]
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John and Veronica Frankenstein. 5 Travelers Insurance Company
(Travelers) paid the Frankensteins almost $27,000 under the Franken-
steins' $100 deductible homeowners policy.26 The Frankensteins' filed a
diversity action in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia against Riggs and Reid's estate.27 Riggs and Reid's
executrix alleged that Travelers was the real party in interest and moved
to substitute Travelers as the plaintiff. 8 The district court granted the
defendants' motion after determining that Travelers was completely
subrogated to the Frankensteins' claim.29 The district court reasoned
that Travelers was a total subrogee and the only real party in interest
because the amount of recovery that the Frankensteins sought was
equal to the amount of compensation that Travelers had paid." The court
denied Travelers' motion to increase the prayer for relief by the amount
of the Frankensteins' uninsured loss and to add the Frankensteins as co-
plaintiffs." The court suggested that either Travelers should sue for the
total amount of the loss for the use and benefit of the Frankensteins,3 2 or
' Id. at 812.
26 Id.
Id. In Travelers, the plaintiff homeowners sued the estate of a pilot that had flown a
plane into the plaintiffs' house and had died in the crash. Id. The district court substituted
Travelers Insurance Co. (Travelers) for the homeowners. Id. On appeal to the Fourth Cir-
cuit, Travelers argued that substitution prejudiced the jury against the insurance company
and in favor of the pilot's widow, who was the executrix of the estate. See Brief of Appellant
at 10, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810 (4th Cir. 1982). The Travelers court rejected
the prejudice argument and held that prejudice from procedural tactics does not affect a
party's substantive rights. See 671 F.2d at 813-14.
' 671 F.2d at 812; see supra text accompanying note 13 (substitution is a remedy for a
real-party-in-interest defect).
Id. In Travelers, the district court substituted an insurer as the real party in in-
terest in the lawsuit. Id. Counsel for Travelers, the insurer, had represented the Franken-
steins prior to the substitution of Travelers. Id. The district court rejected Travelers' offer
to ratify the action. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d
810 (4th Cir. 1982) (Travelers requested reconsideration of substitution motion and sug-
gested alternative of ratification agreement); see also supra text accompanying note 13
(ratification is one remedy for a real-party-in-interest defect).
20 671 F.2d at 812-13.
3' Id. In Travelers, the amount of the plaintiffs uninsured loss was $710.60. Id. at 812.
One hundred dollars was for the deductible in the plaintiffs' homeowners policy. Id. The
balance of the $710.60 represented the actual replacement cost of a damaged rug over and
above the amount that plaintiffs had received as compensation for that item. Id.
" Id. At common law, a partial subrogee could recover damages only through a suit in
the name of an insured for the "use and benefit" of the insurer. See United States v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 381 (1949). Currently, however, a partial subrogee usually
has a choice between suing in the partial subrogee's name or having the partial subrogor
prosecute the action. See VA. CODE § 38.1-31.2 (Repl. 1981) (action may be in name of
subrogee or subrogor); see also supra notes 12 & 16 (majority of states consider both partial
subrogee and partial subrogor to be real parties in interest and allow either to bring suit).
The Fourth Circuit in Travelers never discussed the district court's suggestion that
Travelers sue for the total amount of loss for the use and benefit of the Frankensteins. See
671 F.2d at 812-14. In all likelihood, the Travelers court considered a discussion of the "use
[Vol. 40:45S
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the Frankensteins should petition for intervention.3 Travelers rejected
both the district court's alternatives and preserved for appeal an objec-
tion to the court's substitution order. 4 The only issue at trial was the
cause of the plane crash,' and the jury's verdict was for the defendants."
and benefit" option unnecessary because the Aetna Court had stated that the merger of law
and equity under the Federal Rules eliminated the need for the "use and benefit" practice.
See Aetna, 338 U.S. at 381.
1 671 F.2d at 812. Intervention allows a person to become a party voluntarily to pro-
tect the person's interests in an action. See 3B MOORE, supra note 13, 24.02 at 24-13 to -16
(intervention is means by which person becomes party voluntarily). There are two types of
intervention under Federal Rule 24. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)-(b). If a person seeks per-
missive intervention under Federal Rule 24(b), the person must show that a federal statute
grants a conditional right to intervene or that the person's claim and the pending action
share an issue of fact or law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b(1)-(2). When a person seeks interven-
tion of right under Federal Rule 24(a), the person must show that a federal statute grants an
unconditional right to intervene. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1). A person must establish four
facts to intervene under Federal Rule 24(a) when there is no federal statute conferring a
right to intervene. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). First, a person's application to intervene
must be timely. Id. Second, a person seeking intervention must establish an interest in the
suit. Id. Third, a person must show potential prejudice to the person's interest as a result of
the disposition of the suit. Id. Finally, a potential intervenor must show that the parties
already present in the suit will not adequately represent the intervenor's interests. Id. See
generally 3B MOORE, supra note 13, 24.07 (discussion of requirements for intervention of
right under Federal Rule 24).
671 F.2d at 812.
Id. In Travelers, the parties offered expert testimony concerning the cause of a
plane crash. Id. On appeal, Travelers challenged several evidentiary rulings by the trial
court, including the exclusion of the conclusory portions of a National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) report. Id. at 816. The NTSB had prepared a report on the airplane crash that
damaged the Frankensteins' house. Id. The trial court had admitted factual statements in
the NTSB report but had excluded conclustry remarks that supported a finding of pilot
negligence. Id. The Fourth Circuit upheld the exclusion of the NTSB conclusions about pilot
negligence on the basis of a federal statute prohibiting the use of NTSB accident reports as
evidence in actions for damages. Id. The Fourth Circuit did not determine whether the
federal statute required the exclusion of factual statements in a NTSB report because
neither party raised the question on appeal. Id.
11 Id. at 812. The plaintiff in Travelers had requested a jury instruction on the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur to help establish pilot negligence as the proximate cause of a plane
crash. Id. at 814-15. Use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine would have benefitted Travelers by
allowing the facts of the unusual accident to imply negligence although Travelers had no
evidence of actual negligent conduct by the pilot. See 1 S. SPEISER, RES IPSA LOQUITUR § 1:3
at 9-11 (1972) (res ipsa loquitur permits a jury to infer negligence from the fact of an unusual
accident in the absence of evidence of actual negligence); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 2509 at 377 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1980).
In Travelers, both parties agreed that state law governed the applicability of res ipsa
loquitur to airplane crashes. 671 F.2d at 815; see Smith v. Spina, 477 F.2d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir.
1973) (state law controls use of res ipsa loquitur in diversity cases). The district court denied
Travelers' request for a res ipsa loquitur instruction because the court determined that
state law did not permit use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in plane crash cases. 671 F.2d
at 815. See Surface v. Johnson, 215 Va. 777, 779-80, 214 S.E.2d 152, 154 (1975) (res ipsa lo-
quitur is not applicable to airplane crashes because such crashes can be due to phenomena
other than pilot negligence). On appeal, however, Travelers argued that the district court
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On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Travelers challenged the district
court's order to substitute Travelers for the Frankensteins." The Fourth
Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision in all respects, including the
substitution of Travelers. 8 Although the Fourth Circuit determined that
the substitution of Travelers was technically improper, the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the substitution was not prejudicial because the district
court gave Travelers the option of having the Frankensteins intervene."
The Travelers court found that the substitution of Travelers was
technically improper because Travelers was only partially subrogated to
the Frankensteins' claim due to the deductible clause in the Franken-
steins' insurance policy." The Fourth Circuit held that the substitution
of an insurer is proper only when the insurer is a total subrogee.4 ' The
Travelers court found, however, that a prior Fourth Circuit decision per-
mits a trial court to join a partial subrogee involuntarily in an action by
the partial subrogor 2 The Fourth Circuit determined, therefore, that
had incorrectly interpreted the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Surface. 671 F.2d at
815.
In Surface, an airplane crash resulted in the deaths of a student pilot and three
passengers. 215 Va. at 778, 214 S.E.2d at 153. The crash occurred at night under poor
weather conditions. Id. The Surface court reasoned that unexplained plane crashes could
result from numerous causes other than pilot negligence. Id. at 779-80, 214 S.E.2d at 154.
Surface indicates, therefore, that res ipsa loquitur is applicable only when negligence is the
only logical explanation for an accident. Id.
In Travelers, Travelers argued that the Surface court's discussion of res ipsa loquitur
was only dicta because the precise question before the Surface court was the sufficiency of
the plaintiffs evidence to create a question of fact for the jury. 671 F.2d at 815. Because the
Surface court had found sufficient evidence of negligence without the benefit of res ipsa lo-
quitur, Travelers argued that Surface was not a clear expression of Virginia's position on
res ipsa loquitur when no evidence of negligence exists. Id. The Fourth Circuit found,
however, that the discussion of res ipsa loquitur in Surface, although not strictly necessary
to the disposition of the Surface case, provided a reliable indication that the Virginia
Supreme Court would reject the use of res ipsa loquitur in all airplane crash cases. Id.
In refusing to find that Virginia would follow the majority of states that permit the use
of res ipsa loquitur in airplane crash cases, the Travelers court was in line with the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Pierce v. Ford Motor Co.. See 190 F.2d 910, 915 (4th Cir. 1951) (proper
for federal court to predict Virginia's position on a manufacturer's liability for negligent
construction of automobile). The Pierce court held that a federal court may assume that a
state will follow the majority view among other states only when the state's case law con-
tains no indication to the contrary. Id.
, 671 F.2d at 812.
3 Id.
11 Id. See supra text accompanying note 33 (intervention under Federal Rule 24 allows
person to become party).
,0 671 F.2d at 812-13.
1 See id.
42 Id. at 813. The Fourth Circuit rule that a defendant can compel the joinder of a par-
tial subrogee in an action by the partial subrogor stems from a prior Fourth Circuit decis-
ion. See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974). In Virginia Electric, Virginia Electric & Power Company
(VEPCO), a partial subrogor, sued Westinghouse to recover damages for losses sustained
when one of VEPCO's generating stations built by Westinghouse failed. Id. at 81. VEPCO
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the defendants should have moved for Travelers' joinder, rather than
substitution, and that joinder would have resulted in the presence of
both Travelers and the Frankensteins as plaintiffs.43 Because both
Travelers and the Frankensteins would have been plaintiffs if Travelers
had chosen to have the Frankensteins intervene, the Fourth Circuit held
that there was no prejudice to Travelers' interests." The Travelers
court held, therefore, that the improper substitution of a partial
subrogee is harmless error because the involuntary joinder of the partial
subrogee would have the same result as the substitution of the partial
subrogee plus the intervention of the partial subrogor' 5
Travelers argued, however, that it would not have been a party, ab-
sent substitution, because the federal rule of involuntary joinder of par-
tial subrogees does not govern a real party in interest determination in a
diversity case.46 Travelers contended that the applicable choice of law
was Virginia law, which not only accords a partial subrogor a substan-
tive right to sue without joining the partial subrogee,47 but also prohibits
the involuntary joinder of a partial subrogee in an action by the partial
subrogor 8 Travelers based its choice of law argument on the doctrine of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.49 Under Erie, courts resolve conflicts be-
tween state law and federal law in diversity actions by applying state
substantive law and federal procedural law in the absence of a specific
Federal Rule or federal statute." The Erie test provides two grounds for
sought to recover $200,000 for uninsured losses and $1,900,000 for VEPCO's partially
subrogated insurer. Id. The Virginia Electric court affirmed the trial court's denial of
Westinghouse's motion to dismiss for failure to join the partial subrogee as an indispensable
party. Id. at 86. See supra text accompanying note 21 (discussion of indispensable party).
The Virginia Electric court held that VEPCO's insurer was not an indispensable party,
because the action would completely adjudicate the claim against Westinghouse with no
risk of subsequent litigation. 485 F.2d at 86. The Virginia Electric court found, however,
that a defendant can always compel the joinder of a partial subrogee when joinder is feasi-
ble. Id. at 85. The court did not require joinder of VEPCO's insurer because the insurer's
presence would have defeated diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 85-86.




': See VA. CODE § 38.1-31.2 (Repl. 1981).
4s See VA. CODE § 8.01-5(B) (Repl. 1981).
'1 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The question in Erie was whether a court in a diversity case
should follow state or federal law concerning a railroad's duty of care to pedestrians that
use a path along the railroad's tracks. Id. at 69-71. The Erie Court defined state law as decis-
ions of a state's highest court and state statutes. Id. at 78. The Court held that state law
governs all matters in a diversity case that are not covered by the United States Constitu-
tion or a federal statute. Id. The Erie Court found, therefore, that state laws should supply
the standard for a railroad's duty of care. Id. at 78-80.
" See id.; see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-73 (1964) (Erie covers conflict be-
tween state and federal law in absence of specific Federal Rule or federal statute); Stoner
v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 609 F.2d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1979) (Erie test inapplicable when
Federal Rule or federal statute covers issue).
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determining when a state law is substantive.5 1 If a court concludes that
the conflicting federal law significantly affects the nature or result of a
suit,52 or that a difference in the character or outcome of a suit due to the
application of the federal law encourages litigants to opt for a federal
forum,53 then the state law should govern.' Travelers contended that the
district court's characterization of the Virginia statutes as inapplicable
procedural rules was both erroneous under Erie and prejudicial under
Federal Rules 17 and 19.11 Travelers argued that the district court's
choice of federal law resulted in a tactical advantage for the defendants
because, under state law, the jury would not have been aware of
Travelers' role as an insurer.56
The Fourth Circuit in Travelers rejected Travelers' argument and
held that the involuntary joinder of partial subrogees is a procedural
issue because the resultant risk of prejudice to insurance companies is
only a legitimate strategical consideration." The Travelers court
recognized that the involuntary joinder of an insurer affects the conduct
of a trial and may encourage forum shopping by defendants. 8 The
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (the two factors in Erie test are forum
shopping by litigants and inconsistency between state and federal forums).
' See id.
' See id.
I See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). In Hanna, the Supreme Court addressed a
direct conflict between state law and a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. 380 U.S. at 461-62.
The Hanna Court resolved the conflict in favor of the Federal Rule because the Court
presumed the validity and applicability of a Federal Rule. Id. at 469-73. The Hanna test asks
only whether congress exceeded its constitutional authority by promulgating the Federal
Rule in question. Id. The Hanna Court held that when no specific Federal Rule or federal
statute is involved the Erie conflict-of-laws test applies. Id. at 467-69. The Supreme Court in
Hanna restated the Erie test to be whether the application of federal case law will
significantly affect the nature or outcome of a lawsuit or will encourage litigants to forum
shop. Id. at 468 & n.9; see also Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535-40
(1958) (an exception to rule favoring application of state law may exist if federal policies
underlying a federal decision outweigh state policies underlying a conflicting state provis-
ion); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949) (any state laws
qualifying or restricting a state-created right of action control in diversity cases); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-12 (1945) (courts should apply state law in diversity ac-
tions whenever the failure to apply state law would significantly affect the action's
outcome).
The Supreme Court's most recent decision concerning an Erie choice of law is Walker
v. Armco Steel Corp. See 446 U.S. 740 (1980). The Walker Court upheld Ragan and em-
phasized that Erie furnishes the proper test for choosing between state and federal law
unless there is a "direct collision" between state law and a Federal Rule or statute. Id. at
749.
671 F.2d at 813-14.
8 Id.
5 Id.
1 Id. The Travelers court found that voir dire examination of jurors would prevent
jury prejudice upon disclosure of an insurer's interest. Id. at 814. But see Langley v.
Turner's Express, Inc., 375 F.2d 296, 297 (4th Cir. 1967) (risk of jury prejudice from dis-




Fourth Circuit determined, however, that a state statute is not substan-
tive under Erie, absent conflicting case law, when the federal law affects
a lawsuit's outcome or encourages forum shopping only by providing a
tactical advantage. 9 The Travelers court held that the federal policy
favoring disclosure of all interested parties provided additional grounds
for refusing to apply Virginia law because the federal policy outweighed
Virginia's policy against disclosure of insurance. The Travelers court
concluded, therefore, that the Fourth Circuit's federal rule permitting
the involuntary joinder of partial subrogees controls in a diversity case. 1
Travelers also challenged the involuntary joinder rule on the basis
of the guidelines of Federal Rule 17 for determining a real party in in-
terest.62 Federal Rule 17 incorporates state provisions that authorize
suit without joinder of a person that will benefit from the action. 3
Travelers argued that Federal Rule 17 effectively restricted joinder
under Federal Rule 19 because Virginia law authorizes an insured to sue
without joining the insurer.
The Travelers court held, however, that a real-party-in-interest
determination has two steps. 5 The Fourth Circuit held that Virginia law
determined only whether Travelers and the Frankensteins were real
1 Id. at 814. The Travelers court found that there was precedent establishing that
federal law governs joinder. Id. at 813; see Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Pat-
terson, 390 U.S. 102, 125 n.22 (1968) (federal law usually controls joinder of parties). Never-
theless, the Travelers court applied an Erie analysis on the involuntary joinder of a partial
subrogee. 671 F.2d at 813; see supra text accompanying notes 49, 54 (explanation of Erie test
for conflict between state and federal law).
671 F.2d at 814; see Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535-40 (1958).
In Byrd, the question was whether the federal policy in favor of jury determinations on
issues of fact should displace a state workmen's compensation statute committing the fac-
tual determinations of an affirmative defense to a trial judge. Id. at 533-35. The Byrd Court
found that the seventh amendment to the Constitution directly supported the federal policy
favoring determinations of disputed facts by juries. Id. at 537-39. The policy underlying the
provision in the state statute that delegated the factual issues in an affirmative defense to a
trial judge was litigational economy. Id. at 536. The Byrd Court held, therefore, that when
federal policies outweigh conflicting state policies, there may be an exception to the rule
favoring the application of state law in diversity cases. Id. at 535-40. The Byrd Court
recognized, however, that state law, including procedural rules, controls in a diversity case
when the state's law may affect the outcome of the case and no Federal Rule, federal
statute, or overriding federal policy exists. Id. at 536-37.
" 671 F.2d at 814.
6 Id.
I See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (when statutory authorization exists for a party to sue on
behalf of person that will benefit from lawsuit, the party may prosecute action as real party
in interest without joining the other person); see also supra text accompanying note 47
(Virginia statute authorizes action in name of partial subrogor without joinder of partial
subrogee).
671 F.2d at 814.
Id. See Carlson v. Consumers Power Co., 164 F. Supp. 692, 693 (W.D. Mich. 1957)
(under Federal Rule 17 state law determines persons entitled to be the named parties but
federal law determines who the named parties will be); Rosenfeld v. Continental Bldg.
Operating Co., 135 F. Supp. 465, 467-70 (W.D. Mo. 1955) (first question under Federal Rule
17 is who has right to bring action and second question is in whose name action will
proceed).
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parties in interest.6 The Fourth Circuit found that Virginia law gives a
partial subrogor the right to sue without joining the partial subrogee'
The Travelers court reasoned that once the district court had identified
all the real parties in interest under Virginia law, federal law would
govern the next appropriate procedural step." The Travelers court,
therefore, relied upon the Fourth Circuit rule of involuntary joinder of
partial subrogees and refused to apply state law to determine whether
Travelers' substitution constituted prejudicial error. 9
In rejecting Travelers' choice of law argument, the Fourth Circuit
relied upon a distinction between the substantive question of who is a
real party in interest and the procedural question of the appropriate
response when there are several real parties in interest.0 Although a
majority of circuit courts hold that federal law governs joinder," a ma-
jority of courts also hold that state law determines a real-party-in-interest
question. 2 Under the majority view, therefore, a diversity case involving
multiple real parties in interest poses both a substantive issue and a pro-
cedural issue. 3 The Travelers court, however, is the first circuit court to
6 671 F.2d at 814; see Carlson v. Consumers Power Co., 164 F. Supp. 692, 696 (W.D.
Mich. 1957) (statutory authorization to sue pursuant to Federal Rule 17 does not restrict
joinder under Federal Rule 19).
, 671 F.2d at 814; see Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485
F.2d 78, 83 (4th Cir. 1973) (partial subrogor has substantive right under Virginia law to prose-
cute action for entire loss), cert denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
" 671 F.2d at 814.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 See, e.g., Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 125
n.22 (1968) (joinder is usually question of federal law in diversity cases); Glacier Gen.
Assurance Co. v. G. Gordon Symons Co., 631 F.2d 131, 134 (9th Cir. 1980) (Federal Rule 19
governs joinder); Garcia v. Hall, 624 F.2d 150, 152 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980) (federal law deter-
mines which persons will be the named parties in diversity actions); White Hall Bldg. Corp.
v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (state law concern-
ing joinder is procedural and not binding on federal courts), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1377 (3d
Cir. 1978).
" See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 83
(4th Cir. 1973) (state law determines who qualifies as real party in interest), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 935 (1974); White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202,
1204 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (real party in interest must have substantive right to bring action under
state law), aff'd mem., 587 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1978); Carlson v. Consumers Power Co., 164 F.
Supp. 692, 693 (W.D. Mich. 1957) (real party in interest is question of state law); Rosenfeld v.
Continental Bldg. Operating Co., 135 F. Supp. 465, 467 (W.D. Mo. 1955) (state substantive
law determines who is real party in interest); see also Kennedy, supra note 3, at 678 (federal
courts usually look to state law for determination of real parties in interest).
" See Glacier Gen. Assurance Co. v. G. Gordon Symons Co., 631 F.2d 131, 134 (9th Cir.
1980) (Montana substantive law and federal procedural law control on joinder of additional
real parties in interest); Garcia v. Hall, 624 F.2d 150, 152 & n.4 (10th Cir. 1980) (Texas
substantive law and federal procedural law determine joinder in action involving several
real parties in interest); see also Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
485 F.2d 78, 83 (4th Cir. 1973) (determination of named real party in interest involves
substantive state law and federal procedure law), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
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address a direct conflict between a state's substantive insurance and
subrogation provisions and federal case law concerning joinder in partial
subrogation situations since the 1966 amendments to Federal Rule 19.1'
The Fourth Circuit's involuntary joinder rule derives from a case
decided by the United States Supreme Court prior to the 1966 amend-
ments to the Federal Rules."5 In United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co.,7" the Supreme Court allowed an insurer that was partially
subrogated to a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act to prosecute a
tort action against the United States.77 The Aetna Court determined that
Aetna Surety & Casualty Co. (Aetna), the partial subrogee, was a real
party in interest because a partial subrogee owns part of the partial
subrogor's claim.78 Nevertheless, the Aetna Court asserted in dicta that
Aetna's partial subrogor was a necessary party under Federal Rule 19
whose joinder could be compelled by the United States upon a timely
motion. 9
7' See Brief for Appellant at 7-8, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810 (4th Cir.
1982) (no precedent exists for applying federal procedural law concerning joinder when
federal law conflicts with state substantive law); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 80-84 (4th Cir. 1973) (no mention of conflict between
Virginia substantive law and federal precedent for joinder of partial subrogees), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops, 410 F.2d 1010, 1012-13 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (involuntary joinder of partial subrogee without reference to other law); see also
White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1206-1207 (E.D.
Pa. 1974) (Federal Rule 19 controls joinder of partial subrogee when state law concerning
joinder is merely a procedural rule), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1978). But cf. Carlson
v. Consumers Power Co., 164 F. Supp. 692, 693-96 (W.D. Mich. 1957) (state workmen's com-
pensation statute authorizing administratrix to bring wrongful death action did not prevent
joinder of partial subrogee under old Federal Rule 19).
, See United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
76 Id.
" Id. at 380-83. In Aetna, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company (Aetna) became a partial
subrogee by partially compensating an injured person for personal injuries resulting from a
government employee's negligence. Id. at 368; see supra text accompanying notes 9-12
(definition and significance of subrogation). Aetna sued the United States government
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 338 U.S. at 368.
,' 338 U.S. at 380-81.
76 338 U.S. at 382 (dicta). Although the terms "necessary" and "indispensable" parties
antedate the Federal Rules, the original version of Federal Rule 19 incorporated both con-
cepts. See 3A MOORE, supra note 13, 19.01 at 19-6 to 19-7; see also Shields v. Barrow, 58
U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139 (1854) ("necessary" and "indispensable" are labels for persons that
should be parties so that court can completely resolve controversy). A necessary party was
a person with an interest in an action that should be present in the action to insure complete
and final adjudication of a claim. Id. A necessary party also was indispensable if the court
found that an action could not proceed without joinder. Id.; see United States v. New York
Bank & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463,480 (1935) (action cannot proceed without indispensable party).
See generally Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phan-
tom, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1961) (tracing development of necessary and indispensable party
concepts.) The amended version of Federal Rule 19 abandoned the term "necessary" and re-
tained the term "indispensable" because the Advisory Committee considered the concept of
necessary parties incomplete and confusing. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee note
at (c); see also supra text accompanying note 21 (amendments to Federal Rule 19 significantly
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In light of the Aetna dicta, federal courts disagree whether a defend-
ant always can compel joinder of a partial subrogee in a suit by the par-
tial subrogor.8" Some courts hold that Aetna mandates joinder of a par-
tial subrogee whenever joinder does not create a jurisdictional prob-
lem." Other courts distinguish Aetna either on its facts8 or because of
the subsequent amendment to Federal Rule 19, which eliminates the con-
cept of necessary parties and does not support a rule of automatic
joinder of a partial subrogee.83 Relatively few courts have decided the
propriety of the joinder of a partial subrogee without reference to Aetna.
8 4
Travelers indicates that the involuntary joinder of a partial
subrogee in an action by the partial subrogor is an invariable rule of
federal law.85 Several reasons exist, however, for questioning the Fourth
Circuit's assumption that Aetna mandates joinder of a partial subrogee
affect joinder by requiring examination of risk of prejudice or inefficiency in a particular
case).
8. See Glacier Gen. Assurance Co. v. G. Gordon Symons Co., 631 F.2d 131, 134 (9th Cir.
1980) (federal courts differ on joinder of partial subrogees); see also cases cited infra note 81
(courts holding that involuntary joinder of partial subrogees is fixed rule); infra note 83
(courts basing joinder determination in partial subrogation situation upon particular facts of
case).
8 See Wadsworth v. United States Postal Serv., 511 F.2d 64, 65 (7th Cir. 1975) (joinder
of partial subrogee required if defendant moves for joinder); Virginia Elec. & Power Corp.,
485 F.2d 78, 84-85 (4th Cir. 1973) (Aetna established that partial subrogee is person to be
joined if feasible upon motion by defendant), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); Executive Jet
Aviation v. United States, 507 F.2d 508, 513 (6th Cir. 1974) (defendant can join insurers in-
voluntarily whenever insurers are partially subrogated); City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops,
410 F.2d 1010, 1012-13 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (insurers that are partial subrogees are subject to in-
voluntary joinder).
See Dudley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979, 983 (5th Cir. 1974) (joinder of partial subrogee is
not necessary in suit by partial subrogor for entire loss becuase Aetna only applies in suits
by partial subrogees when risk of subsequent litigation exists); White Hall Bldg. Corp. v.
Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Aetna does not man-
date joinder of partial subrogee in action by partial subrogor when partial subrogee par-
ticipates in litigation without joinder), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1978); see also Gar-
cia v. Hall, 624 F.2d 150, 152 n.5 (10th Cir. 1980) (Aetna applies only in cases where risk of
subsequent litigation exists).
" See Glacier Gen. Assurance Co. v. G. Gordon Symons Co., 631 F.2d 131, 133-34 (9th
Cir. 1980) (joinder of partial subrogee unnecessary in a lawsuit when complete and binding
relief is possible without joinder); Garcia v. Hall, 624 F.2d 150, 151-52 (10th Cir. 1980) (in-
voluntary joinder rule does not apply in cases when no risk of subsequent litigation exists);
Kint v. Terraine King Corp., 79 F.R.D. 10, 11-12 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (joinder of partial subrogee is
not proper when no risk of prejudice or multiple litigation exists); White Hall Bldg. Corp. v.
Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1204-1207 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (joinder of in-
surers that are real parties in interest is not necessary when complete and final adjudica-
tion is possible without joinder), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1978); Braniff Airways v.
Falkingham, 20 F.R.D. 141, 143-44 (D. Minn. 1957) (partial subrogee is real party in interest
but not necessary party when insured sues for full amount of loss).
11 See Glacier Gen. Assurance Co. v. G. Gordon Symons Co., 631 F.2d 131, 133-34 (9th
Cir. 1980) (resolving joinder of partial subrogee without reference to Aetna).
8 See 671 F.2d at 813.
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whenever joinder does not create a jurisdictional problem." First, the
Supreme Court decided Aetna prior to the 1966 amendments to the
Federal Rules." The Aetna Court characterized a partial subrogee as a
necessary party under old Federal Rule 19 because a partial subrogee
has a joint interest in the partial subrogor's claim.88 The amended ver-
sion of Federal Rule 19, however, provides for a detailed examination of
the circumstances of a particular controversy and requires a showing of
prejudice or inefficiency before permitting joinder. 9 In Travelers,
Travelers' absence created no risk of prejudice to Travelers' interests
because the Frankensteins adequately represented Travelers' interests."
Travelers' absence did not create a risk of prejudice to the interests of
Riggs or of Reid's executrix because a judgment would bind both
Travelers and the Frankensteins and would bar a subsequent action by
Travelers against Riggs and Reid's executrix." Therefore, the joinder of
Travelers was not necessary under Federal Rule 19 to ensure complete
relief between the parties, to protect Travelers' interests, or to protect
Riggs and Reid's executrix against multiple liability. 2
See cases cited supra note 82 (some courts limit the applicability of Aetna to actions
by partial subrogees that present risk of subsequent litigation by partial subrogor); infra
notes 87-89 (Supreme Court decided Aetna prior to 1966 amendment to Federal Rules and
the amendments alter the test for compulsory joinder under Federal Rule 19); see also
supra note 21 (comparison of original and amended versions of Federal Rule 19).
7 See Dudley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979, 983 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974) (Aetna is distinguishable
because Aetna was decided prior to 1966 amendment to Federal Rule 19).
" See United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 381-82 (1949) (partial
subrogee is a necessary party); supra text accompanying note 21 (necessary party under
original version of Federal Rule 19 was a person with joint interest in a claim or defense).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (party must show risk of prejudice or inefficiency to ac-
complish compulsory joinder of a person); see also Glacier Gen. Assurance Co. v. G. Gordon
Symons Co., 631 F.2d 131, 134 (9th Cir. 1980). The Glacier court held that compulsory
joinder pursuant to Federal Rule 19(a) is not proper unless there is a risk of prejudice to an
absent person's interest in the lawsuit or a risk of subsequent litigation by the absent per-
son. Id.
" See 671 F.2d at 812. In Travelers, a partially subrogated insurer retained counsel to
represent the partial subrogor. Id. A subrogor adequately represents a subrogee's interests
when the subrogee's counsel participates in prosecution of the subrogor's claim. See White
Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1206-1207 (E.D. Pa.
1974), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1978). A partial subrogor that obtains a judgment
against a tortfeasor becomes a trustee for the partial subrogee of the amount of compensa-
tion that the partial subrogee paid to the partial subrogor. See Glacier Gen. Assurance Co.
v. G. Gordon Symons Co., 631 F.2d 131, 134 (9th Cir. 1980) (court will impose a trust on a
subrogor's recovery from a tortfeasor to protect the subrogee's interest).
" See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 84 (4th
Cir. 1973) (judgment in action by partial subrogor usually binds partial subrogee), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); see also White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton In-
dus., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1206-1207 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (res judicata bars subsequent action by
person with interest in action that participated in or controlled litigation), affd mem., 578
F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1978).
1 See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a); supra text accompanying notes 90-91 (nonjoinder in
Travelers did not create risk of prejudice to Travelers' interests or risk of subsequent
litigation against defendants).
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Second, the Supreme Court's language in Aetna suggests that the
Court limited its conclusion that the defendant could join a partial
subrogee to the specific facts of the controversy between the United
States and Aetna." Third, the Aetna Court's discussion of joinder in the
subrogation context was dicta because the only question before the
Court was whether a partial subrogee could prosecute an action against
the United States. 4 By interpreting Aetna to mean that a partial
subrogee is a necessary party in every case involving partial subroga-
tion, a court completely bypasses a Federal Rule 19 analysis." Such sum-
mary treatment of a joinder issue renders Federal Rule 19 superfluous.98
The Travelers court's refusal to apply Virginia law on the involun-
tary joinder of a partial subrogee is questionable because the Fourth Cir-
cuit's Erie analysis was incomplete, if not imprecise.97 Federal law may
differ from state law on the method of enforcing a state claim.98 Federal
courts, however, may not disregard a state statute that modifies or
qualifies a cause of action.9 Travelers involved a state tort claim by a
See Dudley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979, 983 (5th Cir. 1974) (Aetna applies only in suits by
partial subrogees when risk of subsequent litigation by partial subrogor exists). Aetna con-
tains a general statement that partial subrogees and partial subrogors are real parties in in-
terest. See United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 380 (1949). The Aetna
Court, however, limited the discussion of joinder to the particular parties that were before
the Court. See id. at 381-82.
" See 338 U.S. at 367-68 (dicta); see also White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of
Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Aetna Court's discussion of joinder of
partial subrogees is merely dicta), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1978).
" See White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202,
1207 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Courts should not construe Aetna as displacing a Federal Rule 19
analysis of the facts of a case involving partial subrogation), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1377 (3d
Cir. 1978); Edwards, Inc. v. Arlen Realty Dev. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 505, 511-12 (D.S.C. 1978)
(an automatic rule of involuntary joinder that is based on Aetna is incomplete because the
rule neglects an analysis of the factors listed in Federal Rule 19); see also supra text accom-
panying note 21 (joinder pursuant to Federal Rule 19 is proper only when risk of subsequent
litigation, incomplete relief between parties, or prejudice to absent person's interests ex-
ists).
" See Edwards, Inc. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 505, 511-13 (D.S.C.
1978). The Edwards court reluctantly followed Fourth Circuit precedent requiring the in-
voluntary joinder of a partial subrogee. Id. The court in Edwards criticized the Fourth Cir-
cuit rule of automatic joinder of partial subrogees because the rule contradicted the purpose
and provisions of Federal Rule 19 by eliminating the requirement that a party show a risk of
prejudice or multiple litigation before accomplishing joinder. Id. at 512; see also supra text
accompanying note 21 (purpose of joinder pursuant to Federal Rule 19 is protection of an ab-
sent person's interest in suit and prevention of multiple lawsuits on same claim).
" See infra text accompanying notes 101-108 (Virginia statute prohibiting involuntary
joinder of insurers is substantive under Erie and related Supreme Court decisions).
" See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (federal and state forums
often differ on mode of enforcement of claims).
" See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 745-52 (1980) (courts must apply
state law in diversity cases when state law relates to cause of action by affecting probability
of party's recovery or nonrecovery); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337
U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949) (federal courts must follow state law qualifying a cause of action
because disregard of the state law would enlarge party's rights).
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partial subrogor."'° Under Virginia law, a partial subrogor has the iight
to prosecute an action to recover the entire amount of a loss.' °1 Virginia
law further qualifies the rights of a partial subrogor by protecting
against the involuntary joinder of the partial subrogee because the par-
tial subrogee's presence may prejudice a jury and affect the merits of
the partial subrogor's claim.' °2 The involuntary joinder of an insurer,
therefore, may affect the character and outcome of a trial and encourage
forum shopping."3 The potential effect of the Fourth Circuit's involun-
tary joinder rule renders Virginia law substantive under Erie and re-
quires a court to apply the state statute restricting joinder in insurance
cases."' Nevertheless, the Travelers court cited no support for the con-
clusion that state law protecting the merits of a claim against tactical
prejudices is inapplicable under the Erie test in a diversity action."'
Although significant federal policies that outweigh conflicting state
policies may constitute an exception to the application of state law under
Erie, the Travelers case did not involve such a conflict. °6 The policy
underlying compulsory joinder pursuant to amended Federal Rule 19 is
the avoidance of multiple litigation on the same claim by giving careful
consideration to the interests of the public, the parties, and the absent
person."' The application of Virginia law in Travelers was not inconsist-
ent with the prevention of multiple actions because a refusal to join
Travelers created no risk of a subsequent action by Travelers, the par-
" 671 F.2d at 812-14.
,.. See VA. CODE § 38.1-31.2 (Repl. 1981) (partial subrogor may prosecute action against
tortfeasor); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 83-84 (4th
Cir. 1973) (Virginia law gives partial subrogor a substantive right to sue for entire loss),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
" See VA. CODE § 8.01-5(B) (Repl. 1981) (involuntary joinder of insurer not permissible
in suit by insured); Miller v. Tomlinson, 194 Va. 367, 372-73, 73 S.E.2d 378, 380-81 (1952) (com-
bined effect of Virginia statute authorizing suit in subrogor's name and statute prohibiting
joinder of subrogee is prevention of prejudice to subrogor's claim); see also supra text ac-
companying note 3 (disclosure of a party's insurance coverage to jury is likely to prejudice
jury against insured party).
... See Travelers, 671 F.2d at 813-14 (joinder of partial subrogee may have strategic im-
pact on litigation and may encourage defendant to seek removal to federal forum in order to
gain the advantage of joinder); see also supra text accompanying note 3 (disclosure of in-
surance coverage creates risk that jury will determine liability on the basis of which party
has insurance).
" See cases cited supra note 54 (federal courts must apply state law in diversity cases
when state law has an effect upon nature or result of litigation).
105 See 671 F.2d at 813-14.
108 See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535-40 (1958) (court may
disregard state law in diversity cases when countervailing federal policies outweigh the
state policies); see also infra text accompanying notes 107-08 (no conflict between state and
federal policies existed in Travelers case).
"I See FED. R. CiV. P. 19(a) advisory committee note; see also Cohn, supra note 21, at
1207 (policy considerations of new Federal Rule 19 include interest of parties, absent per-
son, and general public); supra text accompanying note 21 (discussion of Federal Rule 19). In
Travelers, the Fourth Circuit incorrectly identified the policy underlying joinder as the
prevention of undisclosed interests in litigation. See 671 F.2d at 814.
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tial subrogee, whose claim depended on the viability of the partial
subrogor's claim.0 8 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that state
law on the involuntary joinder of insurers is inapplicable under Erie and
the policy exception to Erie is not persuasive.1 9
A second basis for the Travelers court's refusal to apply state law
was the court's finding that state authorization for the Frankensteins to
sue Riggs and Reid's estate did not restrict joinder pursuant to Federal
Rule 19.110 The hypothetical joinder of Travelers, however, was proper
only under the Fourth Circuit's involuntary joinder rule, not under
Federal Rule 19.11 Furthermore, the district court's error in Travelers
was improper substitution under Federal Rule 17, rather than joinder.1
The Fourth Circuit found nothing prejudicial in the substitution of
Travelers because the court equated the Frankensteins' option to inter-
vene after the substitution of Travelers with the involuntary joinder of
Travelers.' The Fourth Circuit's finding was incorrect because the
grounds for the Frankensteins' intervention were more difficult to
establish than the grounds for Travelers' joinder pursuant to the Fourth
Circuit rule.' For example, to intervene under Federal Rule 24, the
Frankensteins had to show an interest in the action and prejudice to
their interest because of inadequate representation by Travelers."5
Riggs and Reid only had to show that Travelers was an interested par-
tial subrogee to join Travelers under the Fourth Circuit's involuntary
joinder rule."6 Moreover, the Travelers court compared the effect of
joinder with the effect of substitution and intervention to discover
whether there was a risk of prejudice only to Travelers' interests, not to
"08 See supra text accompanying note 91 (nonjoinder of partial subrogee in suit by par-
tial subrogor does not create risk of multiple litigation).
" See supra text accompanying notes 99-108 (in Travelers, the Fourth Circuit's Erie
analysis was incorrect).
11 See 671 F.2d at 814.
m See Edwards, Inc. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 505, 511-14 (D.S.C.
1978) (Federal Rule 19 does not require joinder of partial subrogee when no risk of subse-
quent litigation exists and partial subrogor adequately represents partial subrogee's in-
terests).
"' See 671 F.2d at 812-13.
113 Id.
.. See infra text accompanying notes 115-119 (comparison of factors necessary for in-
tervention with factors necessary for involuntary joinder demonstrates that intervention
was more difficult to accomplish than joinder in Travelers).
15 See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); see also supra note 33 (person with an interest in a
lawsuit must show likelihood of prejudice and inadequate representation before person may
intervene under Federal Rule 24).
"6 See 671 F.2d at 813 (Fourth Circuit rule is that defendant can compel joinder of par-
tial subrogee automatically when joinder will not defeat jurisdiction). But see FED. R. CIV.
P. 19(a) (compulsory joinder is proper when joinder is feasible and nonjoinder will create
risk of prejudice or multiple litigation); supra note 21 (discussion of factors necessary for
compulsory joinder under Federal Rule 19).
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the interests of the Frankensteins, the original plaintiffs.117 The only
time that intervention is comparable to joinder is when a court joins a
person to protect that person's interests."8 The intervention of the Frank-
ensteins was not comparable to the joinder of Travelers because the pur-
pose of joining Travelers would not have been to prevent prejudice to
either Travelers' or the Frankensteins' interests." The effect of
Travelers' presence in the action through either substitution or joinder
was a risk of prejudice to the Frankensteins' claim. -!" The intervention of
the Frankensteins could not alleviate this prejudice because Travelers
would remain a party even if the Frankensteins intervened."'
Although Federal Rule 17 protects a partial subrogor's right to bring
an action without joining the partial subrogee, Federal Rule 19 should
permit the joinder of a partial subrogee only when failure to join the par-
tial subrogee threatens the interests of the parties, the partial subrogee,
or the public." The Travelers court's holding overlooks the purpose and
"1 See 671 F.2d at 813-14. In Travelers, the Fourth Circuit equated the intervention of
a partial subrogor in a suit by the partial subrogee with the joinder of a partial subrogee
because joinder and intervention had the same impact on the partial subrogee's interests.
Id. The proper focus for determining a person's intervention is the effect of nonintervention
upon the person's interests. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24; see also supra note 33 (to intervene in ac-
tion a person must show that prejudice to .the person's interests would result from
nonintervention). A joinder inquiry considers the.effects of nonjoinder upon the interests of
the absent person and the parties.'See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a); see also supra note 2i (to ac-"
complish joinder a party must show that nonjoinder would. have prejudicial effect ulpon ab-
sent person or parties). The Travelers court, therefore, should have compared the Franken-
steins' intervention with Travelers' joinder by considering the risk of prejudice to the
Frankensteins' interests. Travelers' original argument-emphasized the Frankensteins' right
to sue without joining Travelers and the Frankensteins' interests in avoiding any jury pre-
judice that would result from the joinder of Travelers. See Brief of Appellant, supra note
74, at 7-10. Travelers ultimately argued, however, that the Fourth Circuit's review of the
district court's substitution order should consider only the rights and interests of Travelers.
See Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 1-2.
11 See Cascade Nat'l Gas Corp. v. E1 Paso Nat'l Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 134 n.3 (1967) (in-
tervention under Federal Rule 24(a)(2) is comparable to joinder under Federal Rule 19(a)(2)(i)
because both measures prdtect an absent person's interests).
"' See 671 F.2d at 812-14 (potential for prejudice to partial s.ubrogor is not determina-
tive of joinder of partial subrogee); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
485 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1973) (choice between joinder or nonjoinde: *of partial subrogee
depends on defendant's interests), cert denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974). But see White Hall Bldg.
Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1206-1207 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (risk of
prejudice to partial subrogor is valid reason for denying joinder of partial subrogee), aff'd
mem., 578 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1978); see also 9upra text accompanying note 3 (disclosure of an
insurer's interest in a lawsuit may be prejudicial to the insured party).
" See White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., 387 F. Supp. 1202,
1206 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (joinder of partially subrogated insurer will create risk of prejudice to
the insurer and the insured plaintiff), affd m'em., 578 F.2d 1377. (3d Cir. 1978)."
III See 671 F.2d at 813-14 (both partial subrogee and partial subrogor would be parties
if partial subrogor intervened after the substitution of the partial subrogee).
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (party with statutory authorization .to sue may prosecute
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